PARTE 3  |  13 NOVEMBRE 2021 - 15 GENNAIO 2022

Spiegazione della Sezione 1

We have deliberately chosen to include the words 'Organization of ...' in the title of Article II because Sections 1-6 of Article I of the US Constitution deal with organizational/institutional aspects, while its Sections 7-10 deal with competences. We think it is better to split those two topics. Our Article II deals only with the organizational/institutional aspects of the legislature. A new Article III deals with competences.

Clause 1 implies that the European Congress has the same position as the US Congress: the assembly of both Houses at the same time. Only that Congress has legislative power. But there are some nuances to this principle. The President has a kind of derived legislative power in the form of 'Presidential Executive Orders'. These are regulations of a lower order than the formal legislative power of Clause1, and furthermore these Executive Orders must be traceable to that legislation of Congress. See Chapter 10. Another nuance is that the US Supreme Court has ruled several times that Congress can delegate legislative power to federal agencies.

In Clause 2, we opt for Brussels as the seat of both the European Congress. This implies that Strasbourg will no longer participate in meetings of the Federation of Europe. The intergovernmental European Parliament has for years been shuttling back and forth between Brussels and Strasbourg because France once forced it to do so. Despite repeated protests from the European Parliament, France does not want to change this. It marks one of the many shortcomings of the intergovernmental system: through its inevitably ongoing game of winner-and-loser in the exchange of national interests, one national interest determines the order of the European whole. 

In the explanatory notes to Article I, it was mentioned that under Article 20, it is possible for nine (or more) Member States to enter into enhanced cooperation. For instance, by forming a federation together which can then be one of the member states of the intergovernmental EU. If that is the case, a new organisational issue arises. The seat of the EU is in Brussels. So is the Federation's.

This complexity is an inevitable consequence of the need for a systemic change, a paradigm shift. The complexity will remain even if we assume that the intergovernmental system will be somewhat lightened when nine Member States first leave the European Union and then participate in it as a single federation. However, the complexity will only be minimal if the EU countries all decide at once to join the European Federation. Then all the existing institutions of the European Union could be incorporated into the Federation. Whether or not in a modified sense.

Spiegazione della Sezione 2

In this section we don’t follow the American Constitution. First, the choice to have one constituency for the whole Federation; no elections for the House of the Citizens per State, as is the case in America and also in the EU. We reject only being able to vote for fellow countrymen per State. We opt for being able to vote for the whole Federation: one constituency of the countries belonging to the territory of the federation. So, a Slovakian should be able to vote for a Belgian, an Irishman, a Cypriot, a Spaniard, a Dutchman and vice versa. This single federal constituency will give rise to transnational political parties. See Chapter 11. Only through a single constituency for the United States of Europe can a direct relationship be established between Citizens and their Representatives. For the text of this Section, this choice implies that an extensive description of the electoral system in America is omitted here.

The Americans' main objection to a single American constituency (instead of elections via the system of electoral votes per state) is based on the fear that the population of the most densely populated cities and areas would gain more influence than the inhabitants of rural areas. As a result, the distribution of power in the House of Representatives could be unbalanced. However, the electoral system we propose is based on the so-called list system: each transnational political party deposits a list that ranks eligible persons, voters vote for the list of their choice and thus simultaneously for a person. The electoral divide determines how many votes a candidate needs to win a seat. Example of an electoral divide: if ten million valid votes are cast for one hundred seats, the electoral divide is 10,000,000:100 = 100,000 votes. This number of votes is needed for one seat; this is the electoral divide.

The political parties themselves decide who will be on the electoral list. Whether there is an (un)balanced representation of the States in the House of the Citizens of the European Federation depends on how the political parties compile their electoral lists. The political parties can prevent small Member States of the European Federation from having no or very few representatives in the House of the Citizens. The trans-European political parties should put good candidates from such States on electable positions.

Political parties are free to choose the candidates they want to stand for election. But we are introducing a revolutionary rule in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 to extend the system of checks and balances. Checks and balances are the most powerful defence mechanism against undemocratic rule. But on the issue of eligibility, there is no check on whether a candidate has the right competence and suitability to perform the most important political office in the federation: representing the citizens. Citizens want to be represented by competent and suitable persons. We cannot leave the selection of candidates entirely to the political parties because they will always maximize their power in the fight for the political values they cherish. If anywhere in the constitutional and institutional system a place must be reserved for citizens to have influence, it is at the front of the door where representatives want to enter the House of Citizens. For a detailed explanation of this rule, see Chapter 11.

This list system is also ideally suited to promoting gender equality. If each political party draws up its list of candidates in the alternating gender-to-female ratio, etc., the composition of the House of the Citizens will, by definition, approach the 50% female-to-male ratio.

We do not provide for by-elections for Members of the House who leave office early. We propose that the list system should include a system of deputies.

Then there is the question: ‘How can a German know whether to vote for a Luxembourger or a Cypriot?’ That is a non-issue. He does not need to know, because the European Congress is not about German or other national interests, but about European ones. He just needs to have confidence in the transnational political party of his choice. And thus, the confidence that that party will put the best candidates, well distributed over the entire Federation, on electable positions on the list. Again, see Chapter 11. 

So much for our first consideration of deviations from the US Constitution.

Secondly, we are not following the term of office of the House of the Citizens. In America, members of the House of Representatives only sit for two years. We are taking six years for the European House of the Citizens, full stop. The reason is simple: the democratic deficit of the European Union, which has been criticized for years, can only be compensated by giving the Citizens' Representatives a central role. The European States, with their nationalistically driven interests of intergovernmentalism, have deprived the representation of the Citizens of its powers for too long.

Moreover, we do not consider it right to send the members of the House of the Citizens on an election tour every two years. When they have just settled in, they would have to go out again to secure their next election. In the United States of Europe, they can devote the better part of six years to looking after the interests of the citizens, rather than the interests of their re-election. We do want to limit the number of terms to three. So, a maximum of 18 years in the House of the Citizens. In this way we can prevent the quality of the work of representation from deteriorating as a result of the concentration of power, laziness, or excessive influence from lobbyists.

A question that we cannot answer precisely at this stage is: how many members should the House of the Citizens consist of? In the United States, this has been set at 435 for 328,200,000 inhabitants (census 2019). Two things need to be determined: 

1. How many members should the House of the Citizens have for the roughly 500 million of the European Union of twenty-seven States? 
2. How large should this House of the European Congress be if, at the start of the United States of Europe, only nine European countries join it?

We do not have a concrete answer to that yet. However, it is estimated - based on a population of around 600 million after the accession of all EU Member States plus some states that are currently in the waiting room - that the House of the Citizens could consist of around 600 people.

Neither can we now foresee in which year the first elections to the House of the Citizens might be organised. However, in view of Chapter 2, we consider it likely that the federation of the United States of Europe will come into force in 2035. 

We do prefer May for that year and for each subsequent election because we are now used to the fact that the elections to the European Parliament take place in May. That is why Article II states that elected Members of this House shall take office no later than 1 June of that election year.

Unlike the US Constitution, in Clause 2 of this Section we set the age of eligibility for the House of the Citizens, at thirty rather than twenty-five years. Why? To have more guarantee that those elected have sufficient knowledge, wisdom and (life) experience for the most important political office in Europe. The emphasis should be on generalists, not specialists. We consider the admission of 20-year-olds to the House of the Citizens to be just as pointless as putting a 60-year-old in the football teams of CF Barcelona or Manchester United. Section 2 goes on to discuss the requirements of competence and suitability for political office in the House of the Citizens. The rest can be found in Chapter 11.

In the third Clause of this Section, we explicitly state, as in the American and Swiss Constitutions, that the members of the House of the Citizens exercise a mandate to be accountable only to those European Citizens. Their mandate is also exclusive - that is to say, they may not exercise any other public function, office, or mandate, at any level of government; in this way we prevent conflicts of interests and the concentration of power.

One more important aspect by the way. In addition to the 435 voting members of the US House of Representatives, there are six non-voting members from the District of Columbia (= D.C. with the federal capital Washington), Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and a resident commissioner from Puerto Rico. Always seeking as much congruence as possible with the American constitutional system, we take the following position for the United States of Europe.

Brussels is the constitutional capital of United States of Europe, but not, like Washington in the District of Columbia, a territory with its own constitutional status that justifies membership in the House of the Citizens. Therefore, no separate seat for Brussels in the European House.

Another question is what status the so-called Overseas Countries and Territories should have. These are countries located elsewhere in the world, but which constitutionally belong to a Member State of the Federation: France, the Netherlands and Denmark. Their associate membership of the European Union is very similar to that of the six territories mentioned above that are members of the US House of Representatives without voting rights. We therefore recommend that these Overseas Territories also be given such a status in the House of the Citizens: membership without voting rights. Of course, this leaves us with the question: how many delegates per territory and who chooses or appoints them? This could be dealt with in a simple way: the Member State concerned organises an election for one non-voting member of the European House of the Citizens in the territory concerned. The principle of incompatibility of offices should also apply here. One cannot be a member of the European House of the Citizens and also hold a public office in one's own constituency.

In a nutshell, our electoral system boils down to the following points: 

• The federation of the United States of Europe has universal suffrage, popular voting, with seats distributed on the basis of proportional representation. 
• Everyone who is registered in a member state of the United States of Europe and is 18 years of age has the right to vote in periodic elections to the House of Citizens. 
• Gli elettori registrati in più di uno Stato membro, ad esempio i lavoratori migranti o gli studenti (originari dello Stato membro A ma che lavorano o studiano nello Stato membro B), ricevono una sola scheda.  
• The constituency is the entire territory of the United States of Europe. No elections per Member State, nor per district. So only the popular vote applies throughout the constituency.
• Transnational political parties place candidates on electoral lists and ensure equal gender distribution on those lists; they also ensure candidates from all Member States so that a voter from one Member State can vote for a candidate from whatever other Member State.
• Dopo le elezioni, il conteggio totale dei voti determina il candidato che ha ottenuto un seggio nella Camera dei cittadini. Un seggio è determinato dividendo il numero totale di voti espressi per il numero di seggi della Camera dei cittadini. Quindi, il numero di volte in cui un partito politico raggiunge tale numero determina il numero di seggi per quel partito. I seggi che rimangono sono chiamati seggi residui. Essi vengono distribuiti proporzionalmente tra i partiti politici.  

Spiegazione della Sezione 3

For the composition of the Senate, we choose the original version of the American Constitution that was drafted in 1787 and came into force in 1789. According to that text, Senators were elected by the legislature of the States. Not elected by the Citizens. This was changed in 1913 by Amendment XVII. From then on, the US Senate is composed by the voters of the States. We wonder whether that is a good Amendment. It was and still is the intention that the House of Representatives represents the interests of the people and that the Senate represents the interests of the States. This is an essential feature of the federal system: the Federation is formed by the Citizens and the States. Therefore, their representation is arranged separately from each other, from two separate sources: one from the Citizens and the other from the States. It is also part of the checks and balances. 

By shifting the election of Senators from the Legislatures of the States to the Citizens of the States, the emphasis is placed on the interests of the Citizens in the Senate as well. In essence, this means a 'strengthening' of the power of federal authority in Washington. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, this has only increased. At least in the perception of the Republicans. A fierce debate between Republicans and Democrats has been raging for some time. Citizens of a number of States are even calling for a withdrawal from the Federation - again, as in 1860. In February-March 2013, there was even an action in the Oklahoma State Parliament to pass a law to nullify the federal Obamacare law. This is constitutionally out of the question; a state has no such power, but this unconstitutional attempt to nullify a federal law is indicative of the strained relations between the Federal Authority and that of some States. These relations flared up again in the period of Donald Trump's presidency. The storming of the Capitol on 6 January 2021 was also part of a call for a number of states to decide to leave the federation again (as they did in 1860).

The EU has a similar problem with Brexit. In order to prevent a federal European Congress from placing all the power in the hands of the Citizens and undervaluing the interests of the States, we therefore choose the system whereby the Senators are appointed by the Legislatures of the Member States. And eight Senators per State. Why not, as is the case in America, only have two Senators per State? And why exactly eight? We do so to ensure that each State of the European Federation is adequately represented in the Federal Senate, however small and sparsely populated a State may be. By assigning each State of the Federation eight representatives in the Senate, each State is assured of sufficient representation to participate effectively in federal decision-making. Moreover, this figure may be an incentive for Europe's smallest States, with populations of at most a few million, to join the Federation. Under the Lisbon Treaty, they are now guaranteed five to eight seats in the European Parliament. By joining a European Federation, they are guaranteed eight seats in Congress - that is, in the Senate - even if none of these smallest States were to win a seat in the elections for the House of the Citizens. The fact that small Member States in a federal Congress also have delegates in the House of the Citizens is a matter and task for transnational political parties, which must organise their electoral lists in such a way that Luxembourg and Cyprus are also represented. See Chapter 11. 

The previous Clause explains why we opt for eight instead of two Senators per State. Another question is: why not twelve, fourteen or even more? The reason is that with that the danger of specialization looms. And specialists we will certainly find in the House of the Citizens. That is sufficient. In our view, the Senate consists of generalists, wise people with broad experience in the way a State translates social developments into sensible policies.

For the Senate, too, we are working on the basis of a six-year term of office, whereby half of the Senate leaves every three years, but may be reappointed once more. The choice to change Senators after three years is based on our wish to achieve a good basis in the parliaments of the Member States. We do not provide for elections for the early replacement of Senators, so a system of deputies must be included in the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and in the Rules of the States.

As in the case of the House of the Citizens, we cannot now anticipate the year in which the first appointments to the European Senate will be made. The date will depend on when the Constitution enters into force. We are therefore thinking of 2035. We can imagine that the appointment of Senators by the State Parliaments presupposes that all national legislatures are in session. However, there is a real possibility that the planned appointment of Senators coincides with parliamentary elections in one State or in a few States. Therefore, we provide for a period of five months during which the appointments of Senators can take place. In this way, the States can appoint their Senators every three years in time, before a Parliament is dissolved (prematurely or not). And so, the continuity of European governance is assured. The only drawback, it seems to us, is that in the event of the premature dissolution of their national Parliament, Senators will have to wait a few extra weeks to take up their office, but in any case, on 1 June of the year of appointment. 

Clause 2 of Section 3 contains the same defence mechanism as in Section 2, Clause 2: it is a check on the ability and suitability of candidates for the political office of representing the States. The Senate makes rules to check the ability and suitability of candidates for the political office of Senator. For further explanation of this rule, we refer to Chapter 11.

Clause 2 provides that Citizens from other parts of the world must have lived officially in a Member State of the federation for at least seven years - and thus have sufficient Citizenship - to be eligible for election.

Clause 3 states that the mandate of Senator is individual; a Senator receives no instructions, not even from the institutions of the State from which he or she comes, or which elected him or her. The mandate is exclusive: it excludes any other public office.

Clause 6 mentions a Court of Justice. So, in addition to the existing Court of Justice of the EU. If all EU countries were to join the Federation, the existing Court of Justice could, of course, take on that role of the Court of Justice of the Federation. As long as there are only a limited number of countries in the Federation, a separate Court of Justice should be established. At least that is our idea. However, this is a subject that we would like to put to the Citizens' Convention for consideration.

Seguendo la Costituzione degli Stati Uniti, le clausole 6 e 7 della Sezione 3 prevedono la possibilità di trattare con persone che si comportano male mentre ricoprono una carica ufficiale o politica, oltre alla responsabilità penale.

As with the Overseas Territories, there is the question of the position of the 79 ACP countries, now independent states but previously colonies of European countries. In Africa, in the Caribbean and in the Pacific. The European Union maintains a special relationship with these countries through treaties, mainly aimed at creating trade relations that (can) benefit both parties. However, this relationship is always under pressure. While the EU - within the framework of the policy of the World Trade Organisation - wants to abolish as many trade barriers as possible, the ACP countries usually advocate the continuation of protection. The periodic renewal of the treaty relationship between the EU and the ACP countries does not seem able to eliminate these tensions. On the contrary. However, we cannot afford this in the rapidly globalizing world. Therefore, we propose a paradigm shift in this area as well: promote the functioning of EU-ACP treaties by giving the ACP countries a place in Congress. What would be against giving six seats (without voting rights) in the Senate, the house explicitly intended for the interests of states, to two Senators from the African ACP group, two from the Caribbean group and two from the Pacific group? In order to promote gender equality, these two members per A, C and P should always consist of a woman and a man. Although they would not have the right to vote, they could participate in deliberations in the Senate committee(s) that prepare a Senate position on trade treaties that the President wants to conclude. This would give a more positive dimension to the increasingly strained relationship between the European Union and those ACP countries: those countries would no longer be negotiators on the other side of the table, but partners on the same side. It seems to us that it is up to the three groups of countries themselves to elect or appoint their representatives to the European Senate. Here too, the principle of incompatibility of offices should apply: one should not hold, alongside the membership of the European Senate, any other public office anywhere.

It does not seem necessary to us to include this in the Constitution itself. This specific relationship between the United States of Europe and the ACP countries can be settled by treaty. Should anyone argue that the absence of a literal passage in the Constitution is in conflict with the Constitution, the Court of Justice can teleologically establish, on the basis of the explicit intention of the Constitution as described here in the explanatory statement, that this is in fact in accordance with the Constitution.

If all the countries of the current EU join the Federation, our Senate would therefore consist of 27 x 8 = 216 people. Plus, the above mentioned (non-voting) 3 x 2 = 6 members from the former colonies of European countries, the ACP group. This confirms the reader's suspicion that there is no room in the two Houses of the European Congress for Heads of State or national Governments.

Spiegazione della Sezione 4

A differenza della Costituzione americana, proponiamo che non sia ogni Camera a regolare separatamente le proprie elezioni, ma il Congresso europeo. Il motivo è la scelta di far sì che l'elezione dei membri della Casa dei cittadini avvenga in tutta la Federazione. In altre parole, non devono essere eletti rappresentanti del popolo per Stato, ma di tutti i popoli affiliati insieme. In questo modo, la Casa dei cittadini è l'emanazione indiscutibile dei cittadini elettivi della Federazione.

Clause 2 is part of American Amendment XX, ratified in January 1933. Clause 3 is self-evident. After the Constitution, the Rules of Procedure of a House of Representatives is the most important document because it governs the procedure of democratic decision-making.

Spiegazione della Sezione 5

Esistono pertanto tre Regolamenti interni: uno per il Congresso europeo (le due Camere insieme) e uno per ciascuna delle due Camere. La registrazione delle deliberazioni e delle votazioni implica l'apertura di tali questioni, a meno che l'Assemblea interessata non decida che alcuni argomenti debbano rimanere chiusi.

Spiegazione della Sezione 6

La clausola 1 può parlare da sola. La clausola 2 riguarda l'immunità che deve garantire il libero esercizio del mandato. Ogni membro del Congresso deve essere in grado di funzionare senza pressioni esterne.

Spiegazione della Sezione 1

Clausola 1 implies that the European Congress has the same position as the US Congress: the assembly of both Houses at the same time. Only the Congress has legislative power. But there are some nuances to this principle. The President has a kind of derived legislative power in the form of 'Presidential Executive Orders'. These are regulations of a lower order than the formal legislative power of Clause 1. Furthermore, these Executive Orders must be traceable to that legislation of Congress. Another nuance is that the US Supreme Court has ruled several times that Congress can delegate legislative power to federal agencies. 

In Clausola 2, we opt for Brussels as the seat of both Houses of the European Congress, but with the reservation that the European Congress may decide to choose another location. The reason is that it is uncertain whether Belgium will be among the initial members of the European Federal Union. And, in any case, the European Congress must have the power to choose another location within the federal territory.

Sono poche le costituzioni che specificano la sede senza prevedere la possibilità per l'assemblea di spostarsi all'interno della nazione, anche se specificano una capitale. Ad esempio, la costituzione svedese indica Stoccolma come capitale, ma consente al parlamento di decidere di spostarsi altrove. Il governo federale degli Stati Uniti si trova a Washington, DC, grazie al Residence Act del 1790, non alla Costituzione.

Congress should decide freely such matters when constituting itself. The peoples’ delegates might even think it proper to mark the transition to a new paradigm of European history by moving the seat of European Congress to a new location altogether. Like Brazil’s Brasilia, or Indonesia's plan to move the capital from Java to the island of Kalimantan, one could even imagine a future new administrative capital, located geographically in the center of our Continent, named ‘Europa’, taken from Greek mythology about Princess Europa and symbolized by a statue of this Princess?

Spiegazione della Sezione 2

In Clausola 1 we don’t follow the American Constitution. First, our choice to have one constituency for the whole Federation; no elections for the House of the Citizens per State, as is the case in America and also in the EU. This constitution opts for voting for the whole Federation: one constituency of the countries belonging to the territory of the federation. So, a Slovakian will be able to vote for a Belgian, an Irishman, a Cypriot, a Spaniard, a Dutchman, et cetera. This single federal constituency will give rise to transnational political parties. Only through a single constituency for the European Federal Union can a direct – uniting - relationship be established between Citizens and their delegates. Thus, delegates of the House of the Citizens are representing the citizens’ European-interests, not the citizens’ state- or district-interests. 

The Americans' main objection to a single American constituency (instead of their present system of electoral votes per district/state) has been based on the fear that the population of the most densely populated cities and areas would gain more influence than the inhabitants of rural areas. Although we understand why and how a district/state-based election system was designed in the first years of the American Constitution, this must be seen as a first-class methodological error. An error in the sense that the essence of a federal state - namely, to look after Common Interests that transcend state interests - cannot be represented by an electoral system based on local, regional, and state interests. Such concerns belong to the competences of the states and their components. A federation is only there to look after common interests that cannot (any longer) be looked after by individual states.

The choice at the time resulted in the weakest element of the American political system. Elections based on districts de facto led to a two-party system. In practice, this meant that the loser's voters were not represented. The adage 'the winner takes all' led to an unprecedented power struggle in which both parties did not – and still do not - hesitate to use any means to gain and keep power. During the Trump era, this reached an all-time low. After Trump’s presidency numerous Republican-controlled states have passed laws that further impede the other party's ability to gain power through elections. Including measures to prevent - or make it very difficult for - certain populations, particularly people of colour, from casting a vote. This is supported by Gerrymandering; that is, periodically adjusting the boundaries of districts in such a way as to guarantee electoral gains for the party that was authorised to adjust the boundaries. This process is further driven by PACs: Political Action Committees that use many millions to influence the election campaign in favour of one of the two parties.

It should be mentioned that in America, too, the pernicious nature of this system has long been recognised. Since 1800, over 700 proposals to reform or eliminate this system have been introduced in Congress.However, amending the Constitution in this way always failed. Nevertheless, as of June 2021 fifteen states plus the District of Columbia (Washington) forged the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact. They agreed to give all their popular votes to the presidential candidate who wins the overall popular vote in the fifty states and the D.C. This agreement comes into effect when they gather an absolute majority of votes (270) in the Electoral College.  This plan, of course, meets with legal objections and will have to prove itself at the next elections. However, it is an important signal for Europe never to make the same methodological mistake of basing federal elections on a district/state system. How the UK's district system with the dominance of one party could have led to Brexit says it all. 

Such a system is a fundamental error seen from the essence of a federal organisation. The Citizens at the base of society vote for local, regional, and national interests in their own local, regional, or national elections. So, on the basis of their own systems. A federal Europe is not allowed to interfere with this. Federal elections are about European interests. The delegates of the House of the Citizens are not delegates of a district, nor of a state, but of the European Citizens. That requires an electoral system that is suited to this. A system that makes it possible for Citizens at the basis of society to understand that they have to give substance to a small, limitative list and exhaustive of Common European Interests. This leads to a fundamental rejection of district and state elections and the introduction of a system of popular voting for the territory of the entire federation. 

È una novità e quindi difficile da attuare. Ma questo è il compito che abbiamo di fronte.

It is especially difficult for transnational political parties. There are already some such parties, but the EU system forces them to raise their profile within the state in which they have registered as political parties. That is, their electoral lists for intra-state positions or for the European Parliament must include only persons from the state concerned. Being registered in several states does not make them transnational, yet. They only become transnational when they are allowed to propose candidates - adhering their values or ideology - for the House of the Citizens from any member state of the federation.

In a federal Europe based on popular voting within one constituency - the territory of the federation - political parties will have to reinvent themselves. Just as a federal Europe says fundamentally goodbye to a treaty-based Europe, so transnational political parties will have to devise completely new methods and techniques to put the best candidates on election lists and ensure that federal elections are about European interests, fully understood and supported by the Citizens. While preserving their own local, regional, and national cultural identity, it should help Citizens to slowly acquire a European sense of togetherness as well. 

Il sistema elettorale di questa Costituzione si basa quindi sul cosiddetto sistema delle liste: (a) ogni partito politico transnazionale deposita una lista che classifica le persone eleggibili, (b) gli elettori votano per la lista di loro scelta e quindi contemporaneamente per una persona. La ripartizione elettorale determina il numero di voti necessari a un candidato per ottenere un seggio. Esempio di divisione elettorale: se vengono espressi dieci milioni di voti validi per cento seggi, la divisione elettorale è 10.000.000:100 = 100.000 voti. Questo numero di voti è necessario per un seggio; questo è il divario elettorale.

The political parties themselves decide who will be on the electoral list. Whether there is an (un)balanced representation of the States in the House of the Citizens of the European Federal Union depends on how the political parties compile their electoral lists. The political parties can prevent small Member States of the European Federal Union from having no or very few delegates in the House of the Citizens. They should put good candidates from such States on electable positions.

In America, delegates of the House of Representatives only sit for two years. Why do we opt for five years for the European House of the Citizens? The reason is: the democratic deficit of the European Union, which has been criticized for years, can only be compensated by giving the Citizens' delegates a central role. The EU-states, with their nationalistically driven interests of intergovernmentalism, have deprived the representation of the Citizens of its powers for too long. 

Moreover, we do not consider it right to send the delegates of the House of the Citizens on an election tour every two years. When they have just settled in, they would have to go out again to secure their next election. In the European Federal Union, they can devote the better part of five years to looking after the common European interests of the Citizens, rather than the interests of their re-election. We do want to limit the number of terms to two. So, a maximum of ten years in the House of the Citizens. In this way we can prevent the quality of the work of representation from deteriorating because of the concentration of power, laziness, or excessive influence from lobbyists.

Clausola 2 introduces the concept of ‘dynamic sizing’. The population of the Federation will fluctuate for a long time. For this reason, it is not wise to fix the number of Citizens' delegates in the House of the Citizens. The number of delegates of that House should be as balanced as possible with the size of the people. That size will fluctuate with the expected growth of the number of Member States (a political matter); it can decrease because of structural shrinkage of the population or increase by an influx from immigrants (a demographic matter). Therefore, a clear and manageable arrangement has to be made between fluctuations of the population on the one hand and a corresponding size of representation on the other. Clear, by using numbers to show that relationship. Manageable, by working with a census cycle of ten years. In this way, the constitution does not have to be amended if the size of the federation's population fluctuates.

In Clausola 3 we are introducing another revolutionary rule. Though political parties are free to choose the candidates they want to stand for election, Clause 3 extends the system of checks and balances by regulating requirements for acquiring the political office. Checks and balances are the most powerful defense mechanism against undemocratic rule. But on the issue of eligibility, there is no check on whether a candidate has the right competence and suitability to perform the most important political office in the Federation: representing the Citizens. Citizens want to be represented by competent and suitable persons. We cannot leave the selection of candidates entirely to the political parties because they will always maximize their power in the fight for the political values they cherish. If anywhere in the constitutional and institutional system a place must be reserved for Citizens to have influence, it is at the front of the door where delegates want to enter the House of the Citizens.

Therefore, Clause 3 regulates that the House of the Citizens lays down rules on the competence and suitability of candidates for membership of that House. This is a mandate for transnational political parties to put on the electoral list candidates who are thoroughly familiar with the fundamentals of the political office, the most important office in the world. So, this task for transnational political parties - in their role as gatekeepers - requires a total change in mindset, selection and training of the candidates deemed necessary for that political office. The law also regulates the Citizen’s role and position in that process.

Clause 3 regulates further that are eligible those who have reached the age of eighteen years and are registered as Citizen of a State of the Federation during at least seven years. Of course, one might wonder whether that is not too young for a political office of that weight. But the same can be said of someone who is forty years of age or older. It is a matter of principle. If one considers eighteen years old enough to be recruited into the army and sent out to protect the country, even with the mandate to shoot, then that age should also be good enough to be eligible for election. Setting the bar on twenty-five will disenfranchise young voters and bar them from electing peers that might be qualified, competent, and great talents/future leaders. We would exclude a considerable percentage of Europe’s citizens, citizens that one can argue have that highest stakes and interest in best possible long-term policies for future custodianship of the planet.

Il sistema di liste già menzionato è ideale anche per promuovere l'uguaglianza di genere. Se ogni partito politico compila la propria lista di candidati in un rapporto alternato tra uomini e donne, la composizione della Camera dei cittadini si avvicinerà, per definizione, al rapporto 50% tra donne e uomini.

The constitution does not provide for by-elections for delegates of the House who leave office early. We propose that the list system should include a system of deputies.

Poi c'è la domanda: "Come può un tedesco sapere se votare per un lussemburghese o un cipriota?". Questo non è un problema. Non ha bisogno di saperlo, perché il Congresso europeo non riguarda gli interessi tedeschi o di altri Paesi, ma quelli europei. Deve solo avere fiducia nel partito politico transnazionale di sua scelta. E quindi, la fiducia che quel partito metterà i migliori candidati, ben distribuiti in tutta la Federazione, in posizioni eleggibili della lista. 

Clausola 4 introduces another form of influence by Citizens by the obligation on the part of the House of Citizens to organise annually multi-day Citizens' Panels. These are aimed at systematically collecting the views of expert panels on how the legislation of the House should be improved to strengthen the policy on the Common European Interests addressed in Article III. The composition and working methods of those panels shall be laid down by law.

With this Clause, we introduce, together with elements of classic representative democracy and direct democracy, also elements of deliberative democracy. The ability to enter dialogue with each other is a necessary condition for arriving at good decision-making, meaning a process of taking decisions after consulting Citizens, after an exchange of arguments in the political arena, in which the best arguments prevail, tested against the public interest and in which compliance with the decisions/laws by Citizens is guaranteed because there is support in society. 

When the instrument of referendum is used, we run into the following problems:

Citizens can make their preferences known:

1. without having to enter a dialogue with other citizens;

2. without having to weigh up the pros and cons within the framework of the public interest; they can let their own interest prevail;

3. without having to present arguments to support their choice;

4. without having to tell the world what choice they have made;

5. without being accountable to anyone.

Put that next to the situation in which a politician must operate. He must enter a debate with fellow politicians within the parliamentary setting; that debate is about exchanging arguments. Afterwards, the politician takes a stand, whereby he is obliged to keep the public interest in mind. It takes place in public, so that the voter can take note of it, address the politician, and take it into account when deciding how to vote in the next round of elections.

In this sense, direct democracy is not the only way in which the decision-making process is not the exclusive domain of politics: deliberative democracy, organised in accordance with the standards based on Jürgen Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action can become a strong junction between citizens and representatives. A power-free space must be created in which participants are completely free to make statements. These statements can be criticised on three levels: is it factually true, is it normatively correct and is the statement truthful?

For such deliberative sessions Citizens are invited who can make statements about the problematic reality with reason and feeling. In this phase, politics does not interfere; it is merely an organiser and spectator.

The next step – policy-making - is the legislator's turn, which is fulfilled by the democratically elected representation of the people.

It is then up to the administration to execute legislation and regulations. It is important that the rules that usually lead to restrictions on the freedom of Citizens are complied with. The quality of the first step in the policy process and the quality of the representation of the people determine the extent to which the rules are complied with.

Finally, the legal test ensures the legal protection of Citizens in relation to government action. The interests of the citizens within the Federation must be represented by the Deliberative Democratic method of working enshrined in the Constitution. 

In Clausola 5 of this Section 2 is explicitly stated, as in the American and Swiss Constitutions, that the delegates of the House of the Citizens exercise a mandate to be accountable only to those European Citizens. Their mandate is also exclusive - that is to say, they may not exercise any other public function, office, or mandate, at any level of government; in this way we prevent conflicts of interests and the concentration of power. So, no double mandates, nor with a position or such a relationship with European or global enterprises or NGO’s as to influence the Federation's decision making.

Clausola 6 does not need further explanation.

Clausola 7 is explained as follows. No such position of power – the Chair of the House - should be in the hands of one single person. Neither in an economic-financial democracy, nor in a social-cultural sociocracy, nor in a judicial-moral meritocracy. Power corrupts, and lots of power corrupts a lot; it is not impossible to corrupt a college of three people, but it is far easier to find out!

Representation Overseas Countries and Territories (former colonies)

C'è un altro aspetto importante da affrontare. Nel contesto della rappresentanza occorre prestare attenzione alla posizione dei territori che, dopo l'abolizione dello status coloniale, mantengono ancora un legame giuridico con l'ex colonizzatore. Verifichiamo innanzitutto la situazione negli Stati Uniti.

In addition to the 435 voting delegates of the US House of Representatives, there are six non-voting delegates from the District of Columbia (= D.C. with the federal capital Washington), Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and a resident commissioner from Puerto Rico. The European Federal Union takes the following position.

Brussels – or any other location of the European Congress - is the constitutional capital of European Federal Union, but not, like Washington in the District of Columbia, a territory with its own constitutional status that justifies (non-voting) membership in the House of the Citizens. Therefore, no separate seat for ‘Brussels’ in the European House.

Another question is what status the so-called Overseas Countries and Territories should have, legally linked to a Member State of the Federation: France, the Netherlands and Denmark. Their associate membership of the European Union is very similar to that of the six territories mentioned above that are delegates of the US House of Representatives without voting rights. We therefore recommend that these Overseas Territories also be given such a status in the House of the Citizens: membership without voting rights. Of course, this leaves us with the question: how many delegates per territory and who chooses or appoints them? This could be dealt with in a simple way: the Member State concerned organizes an election for one non-voting delegate of the European House of the Citizens in the territory concerned. The principle of incompatibility of offices should also apply here. One cannot be a delegate of the European House of the Citizens and hold a public office in one's own constituency. 

In poche parole, il sistema elettorale di questa Costituzione si riduce ai seguenti punti: 

• La federazione dell'Unione Federale Europea è a suffragio universale, con voto popolare e seggi distribuiti sulla base della rappresentanza proporzionale. 
• Tutti coloro che sono registrati in uno Stato membro dell'Unione Federale Europea e hanno 18 anni di età hanno il diritto di votare alle elezioni periodiche della Camera dei Cittadini. 
• Gli elettori registrati in più di uno Stato membro, ad esempio i lavoratori migranti o gli studenti (originari dello Stato membro A ma che lavorano o studiano nello Stato membro B), ricevono una sola scheda.  
• The constituency is the entire territory of the European Federal Union. No elections per Member State, nor per District. So only the popular vote applies throughout the constituency of the European Federal Union.
• I partiti politici transnazionali coscienziosi inseriscono i candidati nelle liste elettorali e garantiscono un'equa distribuzione di genere in tali liste; garantiscono inoltre la presenza di candidati provenienti da tutti gli Stati membri, in modo che un elettore di uno Stato membro possa votare per un candidato di qualsiasi altro Stato membro.
• Dopo le elezioni, il conteggio totale dei voti determina il candidato che ha ottenuto un seggio nella Camera dei cittadini. Un seggio è determinato dividendo il numero totale di voti espressi per il numero di seggi della Camera dei cittadini. Quindi, il numero di volte in cui un partito politico raggiunge tale numero determina il numero di seggi per quel partito. I seggi che rimangono sono chiamati seggi residui. Essi vengono distribuiti proporzionalmente tra i partiti politici.  

Spiegazione della Sezione 3

In Section 3 it is a deliberate choice not to give the House of the States the name 'Senate'. This choice of words has to do with the importance of always pointing out the strength of the Constitution through the system of checks and balances: the balance between looking after the interests of the Citizens - under the responsibility of the House of the Citizens - versus looking after the interests of the States, under the responsibility of the House of the States. The delegates of the House of the States are not called ‘Senators’ because this word is derived from the Latin 'senex'. That means ‘old man’. As they – men and women - are eligible for election from the age of 30, we do not consider the term 'Senator' to be appropriate anymore.

La Costituzione americana fu redatta nel 1787 ed entrò in vigore nel 1789. Secondo quel testo, i senatori erano eletti dai legislatori degli Stati. Non erano eletti dai cittadini. Questa disposizione è stata modificata nel 1913 dall'emendamento XVII. Da allora, il Senato degli Stati Uniti è composto dagli elettori degli Stati. Ci chiediamo se questo sia un buon emendamento. L'intenzione era, ed è tuttora, quella di far sì che la Camera dei Rappresentanti rappresenti gli interessi del popolo e che il Senato rappresenti gli interessi degli Stati. Questa è una caratteristica essenziale del sistema federale: la Federazione è formata dai cittadini e dagli Stati. Pertanto, la loro rappresentanza è organizzata separatamente l'una dall'altra, da due fonti distinte: una dai cittadini e l'altra dagli Stati. Anche questo fa parte dei pesi e contrappesi. 

In order to prevent a federal European Congress from placing all the power in the hands of the Citizens and undervaluing the interests of the States, we therefore choose the system whereby the delegates of the House of the States are appointed by and from the Legislatures of the Member States. Nine delegates per State, not two as is the case in the USA. For the following reasons.

We opt for a larger number of delegates per State to ensure that each State of the European Federal Union is adequately represented in the federal House of the States, however small and sparsely populated a State may be. By assigning each State of the Federation nine delegates in the House of the States, each State is assured of sufficient representation to participate effectively in federal decision-making. Moreover, this figure may be an incentive for Europe's smallest States, with populations of at most a few million, to join the Federation. Under the Lisbon Treaty, they are now guaranteed five to eight seats in the European Parliament. By joining a European Federal Union, they are guaranteed nine seats in Congress - that is, in the House of the States - even if none of these smallest States were to win a seat in the elections for the House of the Citizens. The fact that small Member States in a federal Congress also have delegates in the House of the Citizens is a matter and task for transnational political parties, which must organize their electoral lists in such a way that Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta and other small States – if entered the federation - are also represented. 

La domanda potrebbe sorgere spontanea: perché non optare per più di nove? O meno? La ragione per non superare i nove è che con ciò si profila il pericolo della specializzazione. Nella Casa dei cittadini si troveranno certamente degli specialisti. Questo è sufficiente. A nostro avviso, la Camera degli Stati è composta da generalisti, persone sagge con un'ampia esperienza nel modo in cui uno Stato traduce gli sviluppi socio-culturali in politiche sensate. La ragione per non averne meno di nove è la garanzia che i piccoli Stati membri devono avere di poter controbilanciare adeguatamente la Camera dei cittadini che, a causa della sua elezione sulla base di un unico collegio elettorale, è completamente distaccata dal giudicare gli interessi degli Stati, per non parlare degli interessi dei distretti, perché è eletta per curare gli interessi generali dell'Europa.

For the House of the States, we are working on the basis of a five-year term of office, the same of the House of Citizens. We diverge with US Constitution with its mid-term elections of the House of the Citizens because we want to avoid a situation of permanent electoral campaign running; also diverging from the US constitution regarding the appointment of the delegates of the House of the States: a fixed term of five years and no stepping down of half of the House delegates after three years. We do not provide for elections for the early replacement of delegates so, a system of deputies must be included in the Rules of Procedure of the House and in the Rules of the States.

As in the case of the House of the Citizens, we cannot now anticipate the year in which the first appointments to the European House of the States will be made. The date will depend on when the Constitution enters into force. We can imagine that the appointment of the House’s delegates by the State Parliaments presupposes that all national legislatures are in session. However, there is a real possibility that the planned appointment of delegates coincides with parliamentary elections in one State or in a few States. Therefore, we provide for a period of five months during which the appointments of delegates can take place. In this way, the States can appoint their delegates every five years in time, before a Parliament is dissolved. And so, the continuity of European governance is assured. The only drawback, it seems to us, is that in the event of the premature dissolution of their national Parliament, delegates will have to wait a few extra weeks to take up their office, but in any case, on 1 June of the year of appointment. 

Clausola 2 of Section 3 contains the same defense mechanism as in Section 2. It is a check on the competence and suitability of candidates for the political office of representing the States. The House of the States makes rules to check the competence and suitability of candidates for the political office of a delegate. 

Clause 2 provides further that Citizens from other parts of the world must have lived officially in a Member State of the federation for at least seven years - and thus have sufficient Citizenship - to be eligible, for election, at the age of twenty-five, as a delegate of the House of the States.

Clausola 3 is the deliberative equivalent of Clause 4 of Section 2: the House of the States shall organise once a year a multi-day meeting with panels of delegates of the parliaments of the Member States to gather information on how to improve the realization of the Common European Interests as envisaged in Article III. The law shall determine how these panels are composed and how they shall operate, considering that delates from each parliament of the Member State will participate in these panels and that the outcome of these meetings will improve and strengthen the Common European Interests.

Clausola 4 states that the mandate of a delegate of the House of the States is individual; a delegate receives no instructions, not even from the institutions of the State from which he or she comes, or which elected him or her. The mandate is exclusive: it excludes any other public office. So, when they are appointed by their own state parliament as delegate of the Federation, they resign as delegates of their parliament.

Clausola 5 follows the US constitution by putting the Vice-President in charge of the House of States. Clausola 6rules that in the absence of the Vice-President, the meetings of that House are led by a Chairperson-pro tempore.

Clauses 7 and 8 deal with matters of impeachment. 

Relationship with ACP-countries

As with the Overseas Territories, there is the question of the position of the 79 ACP countries, now independent states but previously colonies of European countries. In Africa, in the Caribbean and in the Pacific. The European Union maintains a special relationship with these countries through treaties, mainly aimed at creating trade relations that (can) benefit both parties. However, this relationship is always under pressure. While the EU - within the framework of the policy of the World Trade Organization - wants to abolish as many trade barriers as possible, the ACP countries usually advocate the continuation of protection. The periodic renewal of the treaty relationship between the EU and the ACP countries does not seem able to eliminate these tensions. On the contrary. However, we cannot afford this in the rapidly globalizing world. Therefore, we propose a paradigm shift in this area as well: promote the functioning of EU-ACP treaties by giving the ACP countries a place in Congress. What would be against giving six seats (without voting rights) in the House of the States, the House explicitly intended for the interests of states, to two delegates from the African ACP group, two from the Caribbean group and two from the Pacific group? In order to promote gender equality, these two delegates per A, C and P should always consist of a woman and a man. Although they would not have the right to vote, they could participate in deliberations in the House of the States committee(s) that prepare a House position on trade treaties that the President of the Federation wants to conclude. This would give a more positive dimension to the increasingly strained relationship between the European Union and those ACP countries: those countries would no longer be negotiators on the other side of the table, but partners on the same side. It seems to us that it is up to the three groups of countries themselves to elect or appoint their delegates to the European House of the States. Here too, the principle of incompatibility of offices should apply: one should not hold, alongside the (non-voting) membership of the European House of the States, any other public office anywhere.

Non sembra necessario includerlo nella Costituzione stessa. Questa relazione specifica tra l'Unione federale europea e i Paesi ACP può essere regolata da un trattato. Se qualcuno dovesse sostenere che l'assenza di un passaggio letterale nella Costituzione è in conflitto con la Costituzione, la Corte di giustizia può stabilire teleologicamente, sulla base dell'intenzione esplicita della Costituzione descritta qui nella motivazione, che ciò è effettivamente conforme alla Costituzione.

If all the countries of the current EU join the Federation, our House of the States would therefore consist of 27 x 9 = 243 people. Plus, the above mentioned (non-voting) 3 x 2 = 6 delegates from the former colonies of European countries, the ACP group. 

Spiegazione della Sezione 4

The European Congress decides in full sovereignty on exceptional judicial-moral issues.

In deviation from the American Constitution, we propose that not each House separately regulate its elections, but the European Congress. The reason is the choice to have the election of delegates of the House of the Citizens take place throughout the Federation. In other words, no delegate of the people should be elected per State, but of all the affiliated peoples together. In this way, this House is the indisputable emanation of the elective Citizens of the Federation.

Clausola 2 is part of American Amendment XX, ratified in January 1933.

Clausola 3 is self-evident. After the Constitution, the Rules of Procedure of a House of Representatives is the most important document because it governs the procedure of democratic decision-making.

Spiegazione della Sezione 5

Esistono pertanto tre Regolamenti interni: uno per il Congresso europeo (le due Camere insieme) e uno per ciascuna delle due Camere. La registrazione delle deliberazioni e delle votazioni implica l'apertura di tali questioni, a meno che l'Assemblea interessata non decida che alcuni argomenti debbano rimanere chiusi.

Spiegazione della Sezione 6

Clausola 1 may speak for itself. Clausola 2 is about immunity which must guarantee the free exercise of the mandate. Each delegate of Congress must be able to function without external pressure.

Explanation of Section 7

This Section provides that the European Congress shall establish the three – non-legislative and non-executive - principal institutions of the Federation and shall regulate their powers by law.