PARTE 6 | 12 FEBRUARY - 5 MARCH 2022

El artículo V tiene dos secciones. La Sección 1 trata de los poderes del Presidente. La Sección 2 trata de sus obligaciones.

Un aspecto esencial de la elección de un sistema presidencial como la mejor base para una verdadera tríada política -en lugar de un sistema parlamentario- es el hecho de que el Presidente es tanto el jefe del Estado como del gobierno. Pero en ambos cargos existe un sistema de controles y equilibrios para evitar que se haga con todo el poder.

La cláusula 1 establece que es el comandante supremo de las fuerzas armadas, las fuerzas de seguridad y cualquier milicia. Esto deja claro que los Estados Unidos de Europa tienen una defensa común. Pero el despliegue de esa fuerza depende del Congreso. El Presidente es también el más alto diplomático.

Las cláusulas 2 a 5 otorgan al Presidente la autoridad:
(a) Nombrar a sus propios ministros. Así, sin interferencia del Senado. Los llamados "poderes implícitos de supervisión del Congreso" son lo suficientemente fuertes como para llamar al orden a los ministros que no funcionan correctamente. También nombra a todos los funcionarios federales.
(b) Solicitar consejo y asesoramiento a sus ministros.
(c) Conceder la amnistía y el indulto.
(d) Hacer tratados. Pero para ello necesita una mayoría de 2/3 en el Senado.

La letra d) requiere un comentario. Los propios Estados siguen estando facultados para celebrar tratados y establecer embajadas en el extranjero, pero sólo en temas que sean de la competencia de dicho Estado. Esto es un efecto de la separación vertical de poderes entre los Estados miembros y el órgano federal que se ha comentado anteriormente. Véase el artículo 1: los Estados miembros siguen siendo soberanos en todas las competencias que no confían a la federación. Este aspecto también contrarresta una disposición de la legislación de la UE denominada "competencias compartidas". Esto significa que, en la UE, tanto la UE como los Estados miembros pueden tener las mismas competencias. Es una ley sin sentido y, por tanto, una fuente de conflictos. Se intenta evitar los conflictos aplicando un principio de proporcionalidad. Sin embargo, dado que el artículo 352 del Tratado de Lisboa faculta al Consejo Europeo a tomar cualquier decisión que considere en interés de la UE, el principio de proporcionalidad es un eslogan vacío. Y una negación del principio de subsidiariedad, que se basa en la intención de la UE de dejar a los Estados miembros lo que hacen mejor por sí mismos.

La cláusula 6 otorga al Presidente el derecho a nombrar a los jueces del Tribunal Supremo y también a los jueces federales. Pero, a diferencia de la Constitución de EE.UU., no sólo necesita el apoyo del Senado para ello, sino también el de la Cámara de los Ciudadanos. Esto es para evitar que una mayoría de un partido político en el Senado -que no sea del color político del Presidente- frustre su política de nombramientos. Pero también, para evitar que un Presidente, con la ayuda de una mayoría en el Senado, nombre sólo a jueces de su propio color político.

Las cláusulas 7, 8 y 9 son desconocidas en la constitución americana. Estamos introduciendo formas de democracia directa con tres referendos. Nota: el hecho de que nuestra constitución sea de, por y para el pueblo significa la forma de democracia directa de mayor alcance. Pero consideramos importante -tomando prestado de la constitución suiza- apoyar la idea de la democracia directa con tres referendos.

Se preocupan:
(a) Cada año, el Presidente debe someter al pueblo un referéndum consultivo sobre la calidad de la política del gobierno federal. El resultado no es vinculante, pero puede sacar a la luz los defectos del funcionamiento del gobierno federal y, por tanto, ofrecer la oportunidad de corregirlos. Se trata de una poderosa herramienta para la construcción de la nación europea.
(b) El Presidente debe someter al pueblo un referéndum decisivo cuando se trate de la adhesión de la federación y sus Estados miembros a una organización internacional con poderes que los miembros de dicha organización deben respetar. Por ejemplo, cuando se trata de la Corte Penal Internacional de La Haya. No vamos a dejar que el Presidente decida si la federación se convierte en miembro de ese Tribunal. Eso lo tiene que decidir el pueblo.
(c) Con el tercer referéndum, el pueblo decidirá sobre un antiguo conflicto entre el Presidente y las Cámaras del Congreso sobre un proyecto de ley presentado por dichas Cámaras. Este conflicto puede paralizar el Estado federal. Sólo el pueblo puede ponerle fin.

La cláusula 1 de la Sección 2 establece que el Presidente actúa en el Congreso una vez al año pronunciando el Estado de la Unión.

La cláusula 2 le otorga la facultad de convocar a ambas Cámaras en situaciones excepcionales, mientras que la cláusula 3 establece que los embajadores extranjeros deben presentarle sus credenciales.

La cláusula 4 es un mandato al Presidente para que ejecute fielmente las leyes federales, aunque no esté de acuerdo con ellas. Puede interpretar ese mandato de forma amplia, pero está limitado por el poder de las Cámaras para restringir esa interpretación a través del control del Congreso. Y, en última instancia, el Tribunal Supremo determina qué es la ley: "La Constitución es lo que los jueces dicen que es".

La cláusula 5 establece que el Presidente debe aclarar a todos los funcionarios federales cuáles son sus obligaciones.

Para aquellos lectores que quieran saber más sobre conceptos como los poderes implícitos del Congreso y del Presidente, la supervisión del Congreso, las órdenes ejecutivas presidenciales y la revisión judicial, me remito al capítulo 10 del libro Constitucional e Institucional Kit de herramientas para la creación de los Estados Unidos de Europa.

Nota especial: Nuestra exposición de motivos sobre el artículo V contiene un añadido especial, a saber, una lista con los nombres de quince Ministerios/Ministerios. Obtenemos esta lista de una combinación de las competencias del poder legislativo y del poder ejecutivo. Pero se trata de una lista tradicional: Ministro de Defensa, Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Ministro de Hacienda, etc. ¿Por qué no también un Ministro para salvaguardar los dos temas más importantes de la Constitución, es decir, los valores del Preámbulo y los derechos del Artículo I? Pedimos a los miembros de la Convención que presten mucha atención a esa lista a la luz de la cuestión de si, con la traducción más bien funcional de esos poderes, los valores del Preámbulo y los derechos del Artículo I pueden preservarse adecuadamente.

Artículo V - Poderes y tareas del Presidente y de la O Federalmbudsman

Sección 1 - Poderes presidenciales

El Presidente vela por que las políticas del poder ejecutivo se atengan a los principios de inclusividad, toma de decisiones deliberativa y representatividad en el sentido de respetar y proteger las posiciones minoritarias dentro de las decisiones mayoritarias, con resuelta sensatez para evitar procesos oligárquicos de toma de decisiones.
El Presidente es el comandante en jefe de las fuerzas armadas, y security agencies ~~and militia~~ of the European Federal Union. A Federal Emergency Law determines the President's powers in matters of emergency.
El Presidente nombra a los Ministros, Embajadores, otros Enviados, Cónsules y a todos los funcionarios públicos del poder ejecutivo de la Unión Federal Europea cuyo nombramiento no esté regulado de otro modo en la presente Constitución y cuyos cargos se basen en una ley. Destituye a todos los funcionarios públicos de la Unión Federal Europea tras su condena por traición, cohecho u otros delitos graves y faltas.
El Presidente podrá solicitar la opinión, por escrito, del funcionario principal de cada uno de los departamentos ejecutivos, sobre cualquier asunto relacionado con las funciones de sus respectivos cargos.
El Presidente está facultado para conceder amnistía y gracia por delitos contra la Unión Federal Europea, salvo en casos de destitución.
El Presidente está facultado para celebrar tratados, con el consejo y el consentimiento de la Cámara de los Estados, siempre que estén de acuerdo dos tercios de los delegados de la Cámara de los Estados presentes.
El Presidente propone y nombra a los jueces de la Supremo Tribunal de Justicia y de los Tribunales Federales, por el Consejo y con el consentimiento del Congreso Europeo.
Siempre que una Federación Mundial invite a la Unión Federal Europea a convertirse en miembro de dicha Federación Mundial, la El Presidente organiza un referéndum decisivo sobre la adhesión de la Unión Federal Europea a dicha Federación Mundial y su adhesión a la misma sobre la base de una Constitución de la Tierra. como se menciona en el Artículo I, Cláusula 7.
El Presidente organiza una vez al año un referéndum consultivo entre todos los ciudadanos de la Unión Federal Europea con derecho a voto para recabar la opinión del pueblo europeo respecto a la ejecución de los ámbitos de la política federal.

Sección 2 - Tareas presidenciales

El Presidente informa al Congreso Europeo una vez al año sobre el estado de la Federación y recomienda las medidas que considera necesarias.
En ocasiones extraordinarias, el Presidente podrá convocar a las dos Cámaras del Congreso Europeo o a cualquiera de ellas y, en caso de desacuerdo entre las mismas sobre el momento de la suspensión, podrá aplazarla hasta el momento que estime oportuno.
El Presidente recibe a los embajadores y otros enviados extranjeros.
El Presidente vela por el buen funcionamiento de la Unión Federal Europea como federación democrática, basada en el Estado de Derecho. El Presidente vela por la fiel ejecución de las leyes de la Unión.
El Presidente encarga las tareas de todos los funcionarios de la Unión Federal Europea.

Sección 3 - Supervisión independiente del poder ejecutivo: el Defensor del Pueblo

El Congreso Europeo crea por ley el Instituto del Defensor Federal del Pueblo, encargado de supervisar el funcionamiento del poder ejecutivo en relación con el bienestar de los ciudadanos.
El Defensor del Pueblo Federal será independiente de cualquier otra institución.
The law defines the powers of the Federal Ombudsman, including the power to advise the President to adjust the policies of the executive branch and to make good the damage caused by the executive branch to the well-being of Citizens. A rejection of the Ombudsman's advice by the President gives the Ombudsman the power to refer the matter to Oversight Committees of both Houses of the European Congress for a decision to be taken by the Houses. A rejection of the Ombudsman’s advice by a House requires a two-thirds majority. If both Houses reject the Ombudsman’s advice, he is allowed require a verdict by the Supreme Court of Justice.
El Defensor del Pueblo está autorizado a supervisar la aplicación por el poder ejecutivo de la reparación de los daños causados al bienestar de los ciudadanos y a evaluar su calidad. Si resulta insuficiente, el Defensor del Pueblo podrá someter de nuevo el asunto a la atención del Congreso Europeo y/o del Tribunal.

Explanatory Memorandum of Article V: Powers and tasks of the President and the Federal Ombudsman

Explicación de la sección 1

Cláusula 1 is the equivalent of Article III, Section 1, Clause 2: it is the President’s responsibility that the policies of the executive branch adhere to principles of inclusiveness, deliberative decision-making, and representativeness in the sense of respecting and protecting minority positions within majority decisions, with resolute wisdom to avoid oligarchic decision-making processes. Citizens can challenge policies they believe do not meet these requirements up to the highest court.

Cláusula 2 rules that the President of the European Federation performs two functions in one person: that of Head of State and that of Head of Government. In addition, he/she is Commander-in-Chief and the Supreme Diplomat.

This Clause 2 places the supreme command of all armed forces and security services ~~and possible militias~~in the hands of the President. Clause 2 does not mention militia. There is no place in Federal Europe for para-military and irregular armed forces, which in practice often go their own way.

The right to declare war on another country is a power of Congress. How does this work in America? Since the Korean War in the early 1950s, it has been accepted that the American President has a great deal of freedom in making decisions to send military personnel to war zones. That is, without first seeking explicit permission from Congress.

Además, desde la aparición de las Naciones Unidas, el ejercicio concreto de ese deber ha evolucionado en el sentido de que Estados Unidos sólo participa en guerras (llamadas acciones policiales) bajo mandato de la ONU. Excepto en el caso de la segunda guerra de Irak. Se supone que operar bajo ese mandato de la ONU implica la aprobación tácita del Congreso.

Entendemos esta amplia visión en los EE.UU. del poder de decisión presidencial en el ámbito militar porque las situaciones críticas suelen requerir una rápida toma de decisiones. No será diferente para la Federación de Europa.

A few military details aside, let us look at the state of affairs in 2012. The Americans spent more than twice as much on defence as the Europeans. Moreover, they had roughly a much better balance between investments (25%), personnel (50%) and operations (25%). In Europe, countries like Belgium, Italy and Greece spent more than 70% of their defence budget on personnel. That meant little investment. Furthermore, the Member States suffered from fragmentation. For example, there were more than 20 different combat vehicles in Europe and defence decisions were mainly taken nationally, without looking at the surpluses and deficits in NATO and the EU. The EU was only able to deploy 70,000 soldiers out of almost two million European soldiers. We do not have data to assess whether this situation in 2022 is still the same as in 2012.

Cláusula 3 gives the President the right to appoint the offices in the Executive. He appoints the Ministers in his Government. As well as the diplomatic staff, government officials and other officials whose appointment is not regulated in any other way. In America, the appointment of these persons - so also that of the Ministers - is made through approval by the Senate. The House of Representatives has no authority in this regard. By allowing the American Senate to have a say in the appointment of Ministers, the legislature becomes co-responsible for the functioning of the executive. We find this strange in the presidential regime of the US. It seems to us a universal rule that the person who has to do a difficult job must be able to decide for himself with which team he/she will take on the challenge.

We therefore believe that it is for the President of the European Federation alone to choose and appoint the members of his Cabinet, the other officials of the Executive Departments and the federal diplomats: under his leadership, they are responsible for the administration of the Federation, including the implementation of federal legislation made by Congress. If members of the Presidential Cabinet are not functioning properly according to the House of Representatives or the House of the States, those Houses can use their Implied Powers of Congressional Oversight to take such a Minister to task. This is better than letting the House of the States decide whether someone nominated by the President as Minister gets the approval of that House. In a conflict situation between the President and the House of the States, the House could abuse its power to obstruct the President. Something that happens regularly in the US two-party system. So, we leave it to the President to appoint his own team.

Sin embargo, permitimos que el Congreso Europeo, en la cláusula 6, desempeñe un papel en el nombramiento de los miembros del tercer poder de la tríada política, el poder judicial.

Cláusula 4 is in the American Constitution together with the previous Clause 1. We think it is better to separate it from his commandership, because the power to seek advice from his Ministers does not apply to military matters, but to everything related to their work. What is important in this respect is that the European Constitution assumes in so many words that the President has Ministers at his disposal, the Presidential Cabinet. More on this later.

Clause 5, the Presidential power to grant amnesty and pardon, a normal part of any Constitution, has also been separated from Clause 1.

Cláusula 6 gives the President the right to make Treaties. But it links this to the duty to seek advice and approval from the House of the States by a two-thirds majority. This means that, as in the US, that House can give its opinion on the conclusion of Treaties by the Federation whenever this House wishes, before and after the treaty negotiations. This provision does not prevent the Member States of the Federation from continuing to conclude Treaties, provided that they do so within their own policy areas. This is due to the vertical division of powers, explained in Article III. This implies that both levels of government can have their own diplomatic and consular corps. For treaties and diplomats, this is already the case in the European Union. The division of tasks between the consuls of each administrative level can be regulated. For example, by declaring federal consuls exclusively competent to assist (commercial) legal persons. In our view, each State of the Federal European Union remains competent for nationality legislation and thus helps abroad to physical persons with the nationality of that State. The nationality of a Member State is combined with the Citizenship of the Federal European Union.

Perhaps this is the right place to comment on the concept of 'proportionality'. This is an important issue within the current intergovernmental system of the EU. Put simply, it is a question of the extent to which the EU authority - or the authority of a national EU state - may exercise the same power. This concept is directly related to the fact that the EU treaties provide for so-called 'shared powers'. This means that one and the same power may be exercised both by the EU authority and by a State. This raises the question: how far may one and the other go in the exercise of this shared power? In practice, this has proved unworkable. Because the principle of proportionality in its application is measured against the principle of subsidiarity: leave to the States what the States themselves can do best. Because the hierarchical decision-making of the European Council has robbed the already severely leaking subsidiarity of its meaning, leading to insoluble problems of interpretation. A federal system does not have this problem at all. In a federation, the concept of 'shared powers' is unthinkable, because of the vertical distribution of powers, which is the essence of a federal organisation. A Federation only has 'shared sovereignty': the States are 100% (and therefore not partially) sovereign in all powers that have not been entrusted to the Federation. And the Federation, in its turn, is 100% sovereign (i.e., not partially so) in the exercise of that limited set of entrusted powers. Again: a Federation reflects absolute subsidiarity and for that reason this concept is nowhere in our draft Federal Constitution. Nor the EU-nonsense of proportionality.

Cláusula 7 departs from the US Constitution in that the President's right to appoint judges to the Supreme Court of Justice and to Federal Courts depends not only on the approval of the House of the States, but of the entire Congress, including the House of the Citizens. By Federal Courts we mean courts which Congress may establish by law and which, in the hierarchy of judicial power, are just below the highest court, the Supreme Court. Following the example of the Swiss Constitution for the composition of the Federal Courts we assign these important decisions to both Houses of Congress - with the difference that the European President also plays a role, namely nominating the candidate judges. Since the Supreme Court of Justice and the lower Federal Courts must enforce the uniform application of federal law throughout the Federation, we believe that their independent operation is better assured in this way, especially in relation to the States whose law may have to give way to federal law. Moreover, the Federal Courts should have the full confidence of those who made and will make the Federal regulations, together with those who apply them, namely the President and his Government, and who can therefore judge whether the candidates for those courts are competent enough.

Clause 8 is the result of Article I, Clause 7 with regard to becoming a member of a World Federation. Clause 8 requires the President to hold a decisive referendum among the people of Europe on the question of whether the Federal European Union should join such a World Federation. Clause 8 also includes the commitment of the Federal European Union to join other federal states in exchanging the treaty-based UN for a federal world government, based on a federal constitution.

Clause 9 instructs the President to organize once a year a consultative referendum among all Citizens of the European Federal Union with the right to vote in order to obtain the opinion of the European people with respect to the execution of the federal policy domains.

Explicación de la sección 2

En la Constitución estadounidense, este artículo es un texto continuo. A nosotros nos parece más conveniente dividirlo en cinco cláusulas.

Cláusula 1 deals with the annual State of the Union. Until the administration of President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921, founder of the League of Nations), this was done in writing in the US. Since Wilson, it has been done through personal appearances in the US Congress. This is an executive task explicitly assigned to the President by the Constitution. He is supposed to bring forward everything that he considers important as Head of State, Head of Government, Commander-in-chief, Highest diplomat, et cetera. In addition, the President has the power and duty to point out to Congress the need to take measures, as he thinks they are useful and necessary. This is the so-called 'Recommendation Clause'. We want to adopt this practice in the European Constitution.

Cláusula 2 gives the President the right to convene both Houses in extraordinary cases. The US Constitution does not make clear what criteria are to be used to define 'extraordinary'. It has taken place twenty-seven times. The last time under Harry Truman, successor to Franklin D. Roosevelt, at the end of World War II.

Cláusula 3 requires all foreign ambassadors to present their credentials in a personal interview with the President.

Cláusula 4 is known in the US as the 'Take Care Clause' or the 'Faithful Execution Clause'. In essence, it is an order to the President to faithfully execute the laws, even if he/she does not agree with them. This is not just about execution itself, but also about realizing the intrinsic intentions of Congress: hence the word 'faithful'. This Clause is held in high esteem in the US and is thus also the source of a strong teleological attitude among those in authority and the citizens. An attitude that manifests itself in a high degree of curiosity about "What would the founding fathers of the Constitution have meant? What goals does Congress want to achieve with that provision in that law?". Nonetheless, it is recognised that the President has broad authority to interpret the intentions of the legislature. But always with the Supreme Court as watchdog, empowered to declare presidential action contrary to the Constitution: "The Constitution is what the judges say it is."

Cláusula 5 gives the President the power to ensure that all officials of the Federal Government know what their job is.

Explicación especial del artículo V, sección 1, cláusulas 2 y 3

NOTE: The following is just an example of the possible composition of the President's Cabinet. The final composition of the Ministries will depend on the outcome of the vertical separation of powers as described in Article III.

We now return to Clauses 2 and 3 of Section 1: the power of the President to appoint Ministers and to seek their advice. One sees in this the constitutional authority that the President has a Council of Ministers: 'The President's Cabinet'. The Constitution does not determine the size of that Cabinet.

The question we must now address is, "How large should the Cabinet of the President of the Federal European Union be?" To answer that question, we would have to consider the dominant executive policy areas that emerge from Article III, Section 2 (the exhaustive list of powers of the European Congress). But we are reluctant to do so. It is likely that such a consideration will only lead to endless debates, drifting away from the requirements of good governance. Especially since, to us, it is out of the question that every participating country will by definition have a representative in that government, as is currently the case in the European Commission and the European Council. Ministries of the Government of the Federation of Europe must have European legitimacy, not national (= member state) legitimacy.

In order to open the debate on this, we cut the knot in a simple manner: we follow (with two exceptions) the policy areas of the Cabinet of the American President. The reasoning behind this choice is the same as our proposal that the election of the President of the Federal European Union should always take place at around the same time as that of the American President: to create the greatest possible homogeneity between the two federations so that they can do business with each other quickly and competently.

Se trata de quince ministros:

Minister of Foreign Affairs: in charge of the foreign policy of the Federal European Union. On the understanding that the States of the Federal European Union retain their own foreign policy for their substantive domains, with their own Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as is currently the case in the EU and in the Belgian Federation.
Minister of Finance in charge of the financial policy of the Federal European Union. Including the federal budget and federal taxes. Including the supervision of the Fiscal Union we advocate.
Minister of Defense: charged with the care of the federal army in all its components: namely, land forces, air forces, naval forces, and militias.
Minister of Justice in charge of all judicial matters.
Minister of the Interior. This American Secretary of the Interior is not comparable to the Minister of the Interior as we often know it in Europe. In this case, it is about the care for the transnational spatial planning, with an emphasis on the care for the preservation of the quality of life.
Minister of Agriculture: responsible for agriculture, stock breeding, fisheries, and horticulture, as well as food security (production, distribution, and supply) and food safety (healthy food).
Minister of Commerce: responsible for the economy, trade, competition policy and intellectual property.
Minister of Labor: responsible for employment and working conditions.
Minister of Health and Human Services: responsible for health and social services, including poverty reduction.
Minister of Housing and Urban Development: responsible for public housing and the development of urban areas.
Minister of Transportation: responsible for all transportation of persons and goods for each mode of transportation between the States of the Federation, including the construction of transnational infrastructure.
Minister of Energy: responsible for energy supply and distribution, as well as for the promotion of clean energy and energy saving measures, and the issue of climate change.
Minister of Homeland Security: responsible for ensuring homeland security, combating terrorism within the Federation, and responding to disasters.

Two ministerial posts from the American Cabinet do not seem applicable to the Federal European Union, namely:

The Minister of Education: we see the concern for education and related matters, for example vocational training, as a matter and task for the States, not for the Federal Authority.
The Minister for Veterans Affairs: to the extent that this would be a relevant policy area in the United States of Europe, we consider it a joint task of the Ministers of Defence and of Health and Social Affairs.

En su lugar, proponemos:

14. Minister of Science Policy and Innovation: in charge of supporting basic scientific research, ensuring innovation in areas such as electronic traffic, product innovation and the creation of new educational systems.

15. Minister of Cultural Relations and Immigration: responsible for ensuring good relations between the peoples of the member states, for the interests of regions and populations with their own language and culture, and for migration policy.

See here the possible fifteen federal ministers as members of the Cabinet of the President of the Federal European Union. And thus, no twenty-seven or more Commissioners to satisfy the national interest or honour of each Member State in the EU. Let alone a European Council.

Esta lista también define la lista limitada y exhaustiva de los intereses generales europeos que debe promover el organismo federal.

Explicación de la sección 3

This Section provides for the institution of the Federal Ombudsman.

Cláusula 1 takes care of regulating this by law.

Cláusula 2 ensures the Ombudsman’s independence.

Cláusula 3 ensures that the power to give advice to the President cannot simply be rejected or ignored by the President: the Ombudsman is allowed to lay the matter before the European Congress. For both Houses, a two-thirds majority is required to reject the advice of the Ombudsman.

Cláusula 4 regulates an additional power: the Ombudsman is authorised to monitor the implementation – by the executive branch - of the reparation of damage caused to the well-being of Citizens and to assess its quality. If it is insufficient, the Ombudsman may bring the matter to the attention of the European Congress once again.

Artículo V - The Federal Government and the Ombudsman Office

Sección 1 - El Gobierno Federal

El poder ejecutivo está formado por el Gobierno Federal y consta de un Presidente, dos Vicepresidentes y un Gabinete de Ministros. El Presidente es Jefe de Estado y Jefe de Gobierno, quien, junto con un Vicepresidente primero y un Vicepresidente segundo, forma un Praesidium.
El Presidente y los dos Vicepresidentes son elegidos por los ciudadanos de la Unión Federal Europea mediante sufragio universal, en el que todo el territorio de la Federación constituye una circunscripción.
Los miembros del Gabinete de Ministros son nombrados por el Presidente en consenso con los Vicepresidentes. Los miembros representan la diversidad de la Federación. Cada ministro federal dirige un ministerio.
Los miembros del Praesidium y los Ministros Federales son de gran integridad cultural.
Las decisiones del Gobierno Federal se adoptan colectivamente por consenso. A falta de consenso, los ministros votan por mayoría simple. En caso de igualdad de votos, el Presidente decidirá previa consulta a ambos Vicepresidentes.
El Praesidium velará por que el Gobierno Federal y sus instituciones apliquen políticas que redunden en el interés de la Federación en su conjunto y evitarán las desviaciones políticas extremas y la influencia de grupos de poder y lobbies no elegidos que puedan poner en peligro la democracia o promover la toma de decisiones oligárquicas o partidistas.
El Praesidium salvaguardará la integridad de la función pública, impidiendo la aplicación de cualquier forma de spoils system y los despidos por motivos partidistas del personal de los organismos y órganos administrativos y gubernamentales.

Sección 2 - Poderes del Presidente y del Praesidium

El Praesidium vela por que las políticas del poder ejecutivo se atengan a los principios de inclusividad, toma de decisiones deliberativa y representatividad en el sentido de respetar y proteger las posiciones minoritarias dentro de las decisiones mayoritarias, con resuelta sensatez para evitar procesos decisorios oligárquicos.
El Presidente es el comandante en jefe de las fuerzas armadas y los organismos de seguridad de la Unión Federal Europea. Una Ley Federal de Emergencia determina los poderes del Presidente en asuntos de emergencia.
El Praesidium nombra a los Ministros, Embajadores, otros Enviados, Cónsules y a todos los funcionarios públicos del poder ejecutivo de la Unión Federal Europea cuyo nombramiento no esté regulado de otro modo en la presente Constitución y cuyos cargos se basen en una ley. Destituye a todos los funcionarios públicos de la Unión Federal Europea tras su condena por traición, soborno u otros delitos graves y faltas.
El Praesidium podrá solicitar la opinión, por escrito, del funcionario principal de cada uno de los departamentos ejecutivos sobre cualquier asunto relacionado con las funciones de sus respectivos cargos.
El Praesidium está facultado para conceder amnistía y gracia por delitos contra la Unión Federal Europea, salvo en casos de destitución.
El Presidium está facultado para celebrar tratados, con el asesoramiento y el consentimiento de la Cámara de los Estados, siempre que estén de acuerdo dos tercios de los delegados de la Cámara de los Estados presentes.
Siempre que una Federación Mundial invite a la Unión Federal Europea a convertirse en miembro de dicha Federación Mundial, el Praesidium organizará un referéndum decisivo sobre la adhesión de la Unión Federal Europea a dicha Federación Mundial sobre la base de una Constitución de la Tierra, tal como se menciona en el artículo I, cláusula 7.
El Praesidium organiza una vez al año un referéndum consultivo entre todos los ciudadanos de la Unión Federal Europea con derecho a voto para recabar la opinión del pueblo europeo con respecto a la ejecución de los ámbitos de la política federal.

Sección 3 - Presidencia y Praesidium's tareas

Preparado por el Praesidium, el Presidente declara en una reunión conjunta del Congreso Europeo una vez al año información sobre el estado de la Federación y recomienda las medidas que juzga necesarias.
El Presidente podrá convocar con carácter extraordinario a ambas Cámaras del Congreso Europeo o a cualquiera de ellas. En caso de desacuerdo entre ellas sobre el momento de la convocatoria, podrá aplazarla hasta la fecha que estime oportuna.
El Presidente recibe a los embajadores y otros enviados extranjeros.
El Praesidium velará por el buen funcionamiento de la Unión Federal Europea como federación democrática, basada en el Estado de Derecho. El Praesidium vela por la fiel ejecución de las leyes de la Unión.
El Praesidium encarga las tareas de todos los funcionarios de la Unión Federal Europea.

Sección 4 - Vacante y fin del mandato del Presidente y de los Vicepresidentes

El Presidente y los Vicepresidentes serán destituidos en caso de juicio político y condena por traición, soborno u otros delitos graves y faltas. En caso de destitución del Presidente, su fallecimiento o su dimisión, el Vicepresidente de más edad se convierte en Presidente, mientras que el otro Vicepresidente sigue siendo el único Vicepresidente hasta las próximas elecciones.
Si el cargo de uno de los Vicepresidentes queda vacante, el otro Vicepresidente permanece o se convierte en Vicepresidente primero. El Presidente nombrará a un segundo Vicepresidente, que tomará posesión de su cargo tras ser confirmado por la mayoría de las dos Cámaras del Congreso Europeo.
En caso de que el Presidente declare por escrito a las dos Cámaras del Congreso Europeo su incapacidad para ejercer las funciones de su cargo, y hasta que después declare por escrito lo contrario, el Vicepresidente de más edad asumirá la Presidencia, mientras que el otro Vicepresidente seguirá siendo el único Vicepresidente hasta las próximas elecciones.
Los Vicepresidentes, junto con la mayoría de los miembros del Gobierno Federal, pueden declarar por escrito a las Cámaras del Congreso Europeo la inhabilitación del Presidente, tras lo cual el Vicepresidente de más edad se convierte en Presidente, mientras que el otro Vicepresidente sigue siendo el único Vicepresidente hasta las próximas elecciones.
If the President has in this manner been declared unfit to act, he can within five days in writing declare to the Houses of the European Congress that he is fit for office. The Vice-Presidents, together with the majority of the members of the Federal Government can, within five days, issue another declaration in writing of the President’s unfitness for office.
If the Houses of the European Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, determines by two-thirds majority of both Houses that the President is unable to act, the oldest Vice-President shall become President. Otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of the office.
El mandato del Presidente y de los Vicepresidentes concluirá a las 12.00 horas del 20 de enero del último año de su mandato. Comenzará entonces el mandato de sus sucesores.
Si en la fecha fijada para el comienzo del mandato del Presidente hubiera fallecido el Presidente electo, asumirá la Presidencia el Vicepresidente electo de más edad, quien nombrará un Vicepresidente suplente. Si un Presidente electo no puede prestar el juramento o promesa para iniciar su mandato, o si el Presidente electo no reúne los requisitos, el Vicepresidente electo de mayor edad actuará como Presidente hasta que un Presidente haya reunido los requisitos; y el Congreso podrá establecer por ley el caso en que ni un Presidente ni un Vicepresidente electos reúnan los requisitos, declarando quién actuará entonces como Presidente, o la forma en que se elegirá a quien deba actuar, y dicha persona actuará en consecuencia hasta que un Presidente o Vicepresidente reúna los requisitos.

Sección 5 - Control independiente del poder ejecutivo: la Defensoría del Pueblo

El Congreso Europeo establece por ley el Instituto de la Defensoría del Pueblo Federal, encargado de vigilar el funcionamiento del poder ejecutivo en relación con el bienestar de los ciudadanos.
La Cámara de los Ciudadanos elegirá a los candidatos de la sociedad civil - basándose en los logros profesionales y las cualidades personales - para servir como Defensor del Pueblo en relación con un ministerio específico del Gobierno Federal. La duración del servicio en la Oficina del Defensor del Pueblo será la de la legislatura.
La Oficina del Defensor del Pueblo actuará con independencia de cualquier otra institución.
The law defines the powers of the Ombudsman Office, including the power to advise the President to adjust the policies of the executive branch and to make good the damage caused by the executive branch to the well-being of Citizens. A rejection of the Ombudsman's advice by the President gives the Ombudsman Office the power to refer the matter to Oversight Committees of both Houses of the European Congress for a decision to be taken by the Houses. A rejection of the Ombudsman’s advice by a House requires a two-thirds majority. If both Houses reject the Ombudsman Offices’ advice, the Office is allowed to require a verdict by the Supreme Court of Justice.
La Oficina del Defensor del Pueblo está autorizada a supervisar la aplicación por el poder ejecutivo de la reparación de los daños causados al bienestar de los ciudadanos y a evaluar su calidad. Si resulta insuficiente, la Oficina del Defensor del Pueblo podrá someter de nuevo el asunto a la atención del Congreso Europeo y/o del Tribunal.

Explanatory Memorandum of Article V: The Federal Government and the Ombudsman Office

Explanation of Section 1 - The Federal Government

The purpose of Section 1 is to prevent:
(a) that too much power is concentrated in the hands of one person, the President, possibly afflicted with autocratic aspirations;
(b) that a two-party system may emerge that allows one party to form blockades;
(c) that after elections, the tops of the Ministries are replaced on party-political motives. This aspect of America's ‘spoil’ system - exchanging top political officials of one political party for other top political officials of the other party after each election - does not only hamper the continuity of policies but is also a cause of corruption. Career civil servants must have the security of reaching the top of the civil service without any political affiliation.

Although the President is both Head of State and Head of Government, he is assisted by two Vice-Presidents. The very great power of a President of the European Federal Union must never degenerate into autocratic decision-making. This is why the President, together with two Vice-Presidents, forms a Praesidium with which the President must consult before making important decisions.

The President and the two Vice-Presidents are elected by the people of the Federation. In this way, justice is done to the trias politica. Influence on the process of appointment of the President and the Vice-Presidents by one or both Houses of the European Congress is excluded. The Federation is a representative democracy. Not a parliamentary democracy because in a parliamentary democracy the Parliament is the boss over de Executive branch. That is contrary to the fundamental principle of the trias politica, protected by a well-thought-out system of checks and balances. Only the people are the boss. The people express that in this Federal Constitution in three ways:

By deposing the federal government if it violates the constitutional order of the Constitution if the people have no other remedy (Preamble, III).
By means of elections.
By various forms of direct and participatory democracy.

The election of the President and both Vice-Presidents might be by ranked voting. There are various forms of ranked voting. If the European Congress approves ranked voting, it can decide by law which system of ranked voting is best to apply in the European situation.

The federal government makes its decisions collegially, which means that each member must outwardly defend the decisions taken collectively by the Federal Government, even if he or she personally disagrees with them. This implies that the Federal Government is collectively responsible for its decisions.

It is a fundamental requirement of this Constitution that the moral and cultural integrity of the members of the three state powers - the European Congress, the Federal Government, and the Judiciary - should be beyond reproach. Just as there are requirements under Article II for the competence and suitability of candidates for the Houses of the European Congress, so too for the composition of the Federal Government.

One of the worst aspects of the American two-party system is the exchange of top civil servants from the ruling party for others from the other party once it has won the election. It is not called 'spoil' system for nothing because it breaks the continuity of policy and makes the administration vulnerable to corruption in the sense of following 'his masters voice'. In a federal Europe, top officials need to be sure they can do their jobs professionally, not partisanly.

Explicación de la sección 2 – Praesidium’s powers

Cláusula 1 is the equivalent of Article III, Section 1, Clause 2: it is the Praesidium’s responsibility that the policies of the executive branch adhere to principles of inclusiveness, deliberative decision-making, and representativeness in the sense of respecting and protecting minority positions within majority decisions, with resolute wisdom to avoid oligarchic decision-making processes. Citizens can challenge policies they believe do not meet these requirements up to the highest court.

Cláusula 2 places the supreme command of all armed forces and security services in the hands of the President. Clause 2 does not mention militia. There is no place in Federal Europe for para-military and irregular armed forces, which in practice often go their own way. The right to declare war on another country is a power of Congress.

Cláusula 3 gives the Praesidium the power to appoint the offices in the Executive. It appoints the Ministers. As well as the diplomatic staff, government officials and other officials whose appointment is not regulated in any other way.

Cláusula 4 regulates that the power of the Praesidium to seek advice from the Ministers does not apply to military matters, but to everything related to their work. What is important in this respect is that the Constitution assumes in so many words that the Praesidium has Ministers at its disposal.

Cláusula 5 regulates the Praesidium’s power to grant amnesty and pardon, a normal part of any Constitution. However, one cannot leave this to one person, the President. Therefore, this is a competence of the Praesidium.

Cláusula 6 gives the Praesidium the right to make Treaties. But it links this to the duty to seek advice and approval from the European Congress by a two-thirds majority in both Houses. This provision does not prevent the Member States of the Federation from continuing to conclude Treaties, provided that they do so within the context of their own policy areas. This is due to the vertical division of powers, explained in Article III. This implies that both levels of government can have their own diplomatic and consular corps. For treaties and diplomats, this is already the case in the European Union. The division of tasks between the consuls of each administrative level can be regulated. For example, by declaring federal consuls exclusively competent to assist (commercial) legal persons. In our view, each State of the Federal European Unionremains competent for nationality legislation and thus helps abroad to physical persons with the nationality of that State. The nationality of a Member State is combined with the Citizenship of the Federal European Union.

Cláusula 7 is the result of Article I, Clause 7 with regard to becoming a member of a World Federation. If such a request is made by such a World Federation to the Praesidium of the European Federal Union, Clause 7 requires the Praesidium to hold a decisive referendum among the people of Europe on the question of whether the Federal European Union should join such a World Federation. Clause 7 also includes the commitment of the Federal European Union to join other federal states in exchanging the treaty-based UN for a federal world government, based on a federal constitution.

Clause 8 instructs the Praesidium to organize once a year a consultative referendum among all Citizens of the European Federal Union with the right to vote in order to obtain the opinion of the European people with respect to the execution of the federal policy domains.

Explanation of Section 3 – President’s and Praesidium’s tasks

Cláusula 1 deals with the annual State of the Union. This is an executive task that in this European Constitution substantively is assigned to the Praesidium and orally to the President. The Praesidium is supposed to bring forward everything that it considers important.

Cláusula 2 gives the President the right to convene both Houses in extraordinary cases. Without further criteria to be observed.

Cláusula 3 requires all foreign ambassadors to present their credentials in a personal interview with the President.

Cláusula 4 is known in the US as the 'Take Care Clause' or the 'Faithful Execution Clause'. In essence, it is an order to the Praesidum to faithfully execute the laws, even if it does not agree with them. This is not just about execution itself, but also about realizing the intrinsic intentions of Congress: hence the word 'faithful'. This Clause is held in high esteem in the US and is thus also the source of a strong teleological attitude among those in authority and the citizens. An attitude that manifests itself in a high degree of curiosity about "What would the founding fathers of the Constitution have meant? What goals does Congress want to achieve with that provision in that law?". Nonetheless, it is recognised that the US President has broad authority to interpret the intentions of the legislature. But always with the Supreme Court as watchdog, empowered to declare presidential action contrary to the Constitution: "The Constitution is what the judges say it is."

Cláusula 5 gives the Praesidium the power to ensure that all officials of the Federal Government know what their job is.

Explicación de la sección 4 - Independent oversight of the executive branch: the Ombudsman Office

This Section provides for the institution of the Federal Ombudsman Office.

Cláusula 1 takes care of regulating this by law.

Cláusula 2 ensures the Ombudsman’s Office independence. And the people’s influence since the elected persons to serve within the Ombudsman Office come from civil society.

Cláusula 3 ensures that the power to give advice to the President cannot simply be rejected or ignored by the Praesidium: the Ombudsman Office is allowed to lay the matter before the European Congress. For both Houses, a two-thirds majority is required to reject the advice of the Ombudsman Office.

Cláusula 4 regulates an additional power: the Ombudsman Office is authorised to monitor the implementation – by the executive branch - of the reparation of damage caused to the well-being of Citizens and to assess its quality. If it is insufficient, the Ombudsman Office may bring the matter to the attention of the European Congress once again.

Special Explanation on the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers

NOTE: The following is just an example of the possible composition of the Praesidium’s Cabinet of Ministers. The final composition of the Ministries will depend on the outcome of the vertical separation of powers as described in Article III.

The Constitution does not determine the size of that Cabinet. It is up the President in consultation with the Vice-Presidents.

The question we must now address is, "How large should the Cabinet of Ministers of the European Federal Union be?" To answer that question, we would have to consider the dominant executive policy areas that emerge from Article III, Section 2 (the exhaustive list of powers of the European Congress). But we are reluctant to do so. It is likely that such a consideration will only lead to endless debates, drifting away from the requirements of good governance. Especially since, to us, it is out of the question that every participating country will by definition have a representative in that government, as is currently the case in the European Commission and the European Council. Federal Ministers are Europeans, serving common European interests. They are not representatives of national governments, serving national interests. The same applies to the civil service within Ministries. Ministries of the Government of the Federation of Europe must have European legitimacy, not national (= member state) legitimacy.

In order to open the debate on this, we cut the knot in a simple manner: we follow (with two exceptions) the policy areas/ministries of the Cabinet of the American President. The reasoning behind this choice is the same as our proposal that the election of the President of the Federal European Union should always take place at around the same time as that of the American President: to create the greatest possible homogeneity between the two federations so that they can do business with each other quickly and competently.

Se trata de quince ministros:
(1) Minister of Foreign Affairs: in charge of the foreign policy of the Federal European Union. On the understanding that the States of the Federal European Union retain their own foreign policy for their substantive domains, with their own Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as is currently the case in the EU and in the Belgian Federation.
(2) Minister of Finance in charge of the financial policy of the Federal European Union. Including the federal budget and federal taxes. Including the supervision of the Fiscal Union we advocate.
(3) Minister of Defense: charged with the care of the federal army in all its components: namely, land forces, air forces, naval forces, and militias.
(4) Minister of Justice in charge of all judicial matters.
(5)Minister of the Interior. This American Secretary of the Interior is not comparable to the Minister of the Interior as we often know it in Europe. In this case, it is about the care for the transnational spatial planning, with an emphasis on the care for the preservation of the quality of life.
(6) Minister of Agriculture: responsible for agriculture, stock breeding, fisheries, and horticulture, as well as food security (production, distribution, and supply) and food safety (healthy food).
(7) Minister of Commerce: responsible for the economy, trade, competition policy and intellectual property.
(8) Minister of Labor: responsible for employment and working conditions.
(9) Minister of Health and Human Services: responsible for health and social services, including poverty reduction.
(10) Minister of Housing and Urban Development: responsible for public housing and the development of urban areas.
(11) Minister of Transportation: responsible for all transportation of persons and goods for each mode of transportation between the States of the Federation, including the construction of transnational infrastructure.
(12) Minister of Energy: responsible for energy supply and distribution, as well as for the promotion of clean energy and energy saving measures, and the issue of climate change.
(13) Minister of Homeland Security: responsible for ensuring homeland security, combating terrorism within the Federation, and responding to disasters.

Two ministerial posts from the American Cabinet do not seem applicable to the Federal European Union, namely:

The Minister of Education: we see the concern for education and related matters, for example vocational training, as a matter and task for the States, not for the Federal Authority.
The Minister for Veterans Affairs: to the extent that this would be a relevant policy area in the United States of Europe, we consider it a joint task of the Ministers of Defence and of Health and Social Affairs.

Instead, we propose:
(14) Minister of Science Policy and Innovation: in charge of supporting basic scientific research, ensuring innovation in areas such as electronic traffic, product innovation and the creation of new educational systems.
(15) Minister of Cultural Relations and Immigration: responsible for ensuring good relations between the peoples of the member states, for the interests of regions and populations with their own language and culture, and for migration policy.

See here the possible fifteen federal ministers as members of the Cabinet of the Praesidium of the European Federal Union. And thus, no twenty-seven or more Commissioners to satisfy the national interest or honour of each Member State in the EU. Let alone a European Council.

Ir a la parte 7

Proceso de mejora de la Constitución Parte 6

PARTE 6 | 12 FEBRUARY - 5 MARCH 2022

Artículo V - Poderes y tareas del Presidente y de la O Federalmbudsman

Explanatory Memorandum of Article V: Powers and tasks of the President and the Federal Ombudsman

Explanatory Memorandum of Article V: The Federal Government and the Ombudsman Office