Απάντηση στο: Ranked voting in presidential elections

[Lars Næsbye Christensen]

I see that the revised version now uses a two-round system of elections if no-one wins the first round with a majority. I applaud that we take into account more than a simple majority which could be as small as slightly above 1/candidates.

But is it a good idea to have two potential presidential election rounds in such a case, costing many resources and delaying a very important decision for the people of the Federation?

There are several ways of making the presidential election method better with only one round of preferential voting. I strongly suggest we look into options of preferential voting to get as close as possible to the collective center of voter preference without using multiple rounds.

A modern method is called the Schulze method. It is also based on voters expressing a ranked preference in one round, allows for ties and has been popular in many organisations since its proposal. It is quite interesting to study, if a little heavy on the electoral mathematics: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method

My main point is: can we get closer to the center of voter preference for the executive without asking them to interact too many times?

If the main argument against single-round preferential voting is that it is too hard for people to understand in detail, I would like to point to the fact that in the US people gladly debate the local and regional mathematics behind proportional representation as well as the complex rules of American football. Most Danes don’t understand the d’Hondt and Sainte-Laguë methods used in electing the Danish parliament, but accept that there are measures to avoid big regional imbalances.

The voters should feel confident that the method is as close to hitting the optimal voter preference, and they need only vote according to their wishes. Can we deliver this?